| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3926 |
| DP3926 The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement | |
| Juan Francisco Jimeno; Tito Boeri | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for each other?s trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multiple equilibria can emerge. If competition is sufficiently soft and trained workers are substitutes, firms may invest in non-specific training if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer a competitive disadvantage or need to pay high wages in order to attract trained workers. Government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into a focal equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | General training Human capital Oligopoly Turnover |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3926 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532911 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Francisco Jimeno,Tito Boeri. DP3926 The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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