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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP3940 |
DP3940 A Product Market Theory of Worker Training | |
Hans Gersbach; Armin Schmutzler | |
发表日期 | 2003-06-23 |
出版年 | 2003 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study informative advertising within a random-utility, non-localized competition model of product differentiation. In a symmetric equilibrium, advertisement is sub-optimal when product differentiation is small, and excessive otherwise. Increasing the number of firms may increase or decrease the market price. We emphasise that quasi-concavity of profits may fail, as firms may prefer a high price deviation, targeting consumers that only become informed about their product (a feature that, while present in earlier models of informative advertising, has not received enough attention). As product differentiation becomes small, a symmetric equilibrium does not exist. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Random utility Informative advertising Product differentiation Non-localized competition |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3940 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532923 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Armin Schmutzler. DP3940 A Product Market Theory of Worker Training. 2003. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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