| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3943 |
| DP3943 Efficient Pricing of Large Value Interbank Payment Systems | |
| Jean Charles Rochet; Cornelia Holthausen | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios regarding the flow of benefits through a network, the so-called 1-way and 2-way flow model. Our main results show that the prediction based on Nash and strict Nash equilibrium works well in the 1-way flow model but largely fails in the 2-way flow model. We observe a strong learning dynamic in the 1-way flow model but less so in the 2-way flow model. Finally, costs of a direct link have a positive impact on the occurrence of (strict) Nash networks in the 1-way flow model but a negative impact in the 2-way flow model. In our discussion on possible explanations for these results we focus on strategic asymmetry and asymmetry with respect to payoffs. We find that the latter asymmetry, i.e. payoff inequity, plays an important role in the network formation process. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Network formation Experiments Coordination Fairness |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3943 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532926 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Charles Rochet,Cornelia Holthausen. DP3943 Efficient Pricing of Large Value Interbank Payment Systems. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
