G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3946
DP3946 Does 'Non-Committed' Government Always Generate Lower Social Welfare then its 'Committed' Counter-Part
Kresimir Zigic
发表日期2003-06-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要Early retirement represents a policy response to the appearance of a mass of redundant middle-aged workers, who were not entitled to a pension transfer in their old age. This policy is distortionary, since it reduces the incentive to accumulate human capital, hence decreasing economic growth: it shifts part of the tax burden on future generations. Why was it adopted? We suggest that alternative policies - which do not introduce long-term distortions, but impose a larger cost on the current young generation of workers - were blocked by the political opposition of a coalition of the extreme: high income workers, who did not plan to retire early, but sought to reduce the current tax burden, and low income workers, who expected to retire early and to benefit from the early retirement pension.
主题Public Economics
关键词Human capital accumulation Political sustainability Redistributive policies
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3946
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532928
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kresimir Zigic. DP3946 Does 'Non-Committed' Government Always Generate Lower Social Welfare then its 'Committed' Counter-Part. 2003.
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