| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3961 |
| DP3961 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Jesse Fried | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the endogenous determination of contracts in competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain first over the type of contract and then over the contract terms. Upstream firms always opt for non-linear contracts, which specify the input quantity and its total price. Downstream firms also opt for non-linear contracts, unless their bargaining power is low, in which case they prefer wholesale price contracts. While welfare is maximized under two-part tariffs, these are dominated in equilibrium by non-linear contracts. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Vertical chains Strategic contracting Bargaining Two-part tariffs Non-linear contracts Wholesale prices |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3961 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532943 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Jesse Fried. DP3961 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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