| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3977 |
| DP3977 Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labour Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogenous Production Technologies | |
| Gerard Van den Berg | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to ?cheat? on partners. Optimally designed ?courageous? leniency programmes reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all other parties and achieve the first best: complete and costless deterrence. ?Moderate? leniency programs that only reduce or cancel sanctions may deter organized crime (a) by protecting an agent that defects from fines and from other agents? punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust Cartels Collusion Competition policy Crime deterrence Law enforcement Leniency Organized crime Risk dominance Self-reporting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3977 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532956 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Van den Berg. DP3977 Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labour Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogenous Production Technologies. 2003. |
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