| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3986 |
| DP3986 Equilibrium Search Unemployment, Endogenous Participation and Labour Market Flows | |
| Pietro Garibaldi; Etienne Wasmer | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an optimal regulation model in which the regulated firm?s production cost is subject to random, publicly observable shocks. The distribution of these shocks is correlated with the firm?s cost type, which is private information. The regulator designs an incentive compatible regulatory scheme that adjusts itself automatically ex-post given the realization of the cost shock. We derive the optimal scheme, assuming that there is an upper bound on the financial losses that the firm can sustain in any given state. We first consider a two-types, two-states case, and then extend the results to the case of a continuum of firm types and an arbitrary finite number of states. We show that the first best allocation can be implemented if the state of nature conveys enough information about the firm?s type and (or) the maximal loss that the firm can sustain is sufficiently large. Otherwise, the solution is characterized by classical second-best features. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Optimal regulation Asymmetric information Cost shocks Limited liability Correlated information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3986 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532963 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pietro Garibaldi,Etienne Wasmer. DP3986 Equilibrium Search Unemployment, Endogenous Participation and Labour Market Flows. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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