| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3989
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| DP3989 Domestic Labour Markets and Foreign Direct Investment |
| Jan I. Haaland; Ian Wooton
|
| 发表日期 | 2003-07-23
|
| 出版年 | 2003
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the government, does not mitigate the problem of time-inconsistency, but merely relocates it. We argue here that this is not so, and that delegation enables a wider class of economies to sustain zero inflation than would be able to do so in its absence. We consider an economy in which the government faces re-appointment costs, that is, costs associated with sacking one central banker and replacing them with another, costs which are intended to protect central bank independence. We show that, by means of suitable announcements of incentive schemes for the central bank, combined with appropriate actually implemented schemes, delegated policy enables zero inflation to prevail in economies in which it could not do so without delegated policy. These economies are ones that have relatively high discount rates (and so low discount factors). |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | Credibility
Delegation
Time-inconsistency
Independent central banks
monetary policy
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3989
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532966
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jan I. Haaland,Ian Wooton. DP3989 Domestic Labour Markets and Foreign Direct Investment. 2003.
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