G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3989
DP3989 Domestic Labour Markets and Foreign Direct Investment
Jan I. Haaland; Ian Wooton
发表日期2003-07-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the government, does not mitigate the problem of time-inconsistency, but merely relocates it. We argue here that this is not so, and that delegation enables a wider class of economies to sustain zero inflation than would be able to do so in its absence. We consider an economy in which the government faces re-appointment costs, that is, costs associated with sacking one central banker and replacing them with another, costs which are intended to protect central bank independence. We show that, by means of suitable announcements of incentive schemes for the central bank, combined with appropriate actually implemented schemes, delegated policy enables zero inflation to prevail in economies in which it could not do so without delegated policy. These economies are ones that have relatively high discount rates (and so low discount factors).
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Credibility Delegation Time-inconsistency Independent central banks monetary policy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3989
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532966
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jan I. Haaland,Ian Wooton. DP3989 Domestic Labour Markets and Foreign Direct Investment. 2003.
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