| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3996
|
| DP3996 Credit, Wages and Bankruptcy Laws |
| Bruno Biais; Thomas Mariotti
|
| 发表日期 | 2003-08-23
|
| 出版年 | 2003
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may benefit from being friends with other criminals (by learning and acquiring proper know-how in the crime business). We first study the Nash equilibrium of this game by taking the social network connecting agents as given. We show that this game always has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for generic values of the parameters. Ex ante identical individuals connected through a network can end up with very different equilibrium outcomes: either employed, or isolated criminal or criminals in networks. We also show that multiple equilibria with different number of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals. We then consider a two-stage network formation and crime decisions game. We show that the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes holds even when we allow for endogenous network formation. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Crime
Social Networks
Strategic interactions
Multiple equilibria
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3996
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532975
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Bruno Biais,Thomas Mariotti. DP3996 Credit, Wages and Bankruptcy Laws. 2003.
|
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