| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP4007
|
| DP4007 Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies |
| Allan Drazen; Nuno Limão
|
| 发表日期 | 2003-08-23
|
| 出版年 | 2003
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study optimal monetary and fiscal stabilization policy in a two-country monetary union in the presence of (inefficient) mark-up shocks, price rigidities and monopolistic competition. The underlying dynamic system contains two Phillips curves featuring public spending and mark-up shocks. We derive the second-order welfare loss approximation and characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policies under commitment and discretion. With symmetric rigidities, fiscal policy will not be employed in stabilizing union-level variables. Relative spending levels, however, are used to stabilize relative inflation rates and the terms of trade. Under commitment, both monetary policy and relative spending are inertial, while this is not the case under discretion. We conduct numerical analyses to assess the welfare gains from commitment and from having resource to fiscal stabilization. These gains are substantial. We conclude by investigating some simple monetary and fiscal policy rules. The former are based on the standard Taylor rule, while the fiscal rules link spending to output gaps. With mark-up shocks, the optimal fiscal rules are pro-cyclical. Finally, we find that welfare gains are obtained by making the rules inertial. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | Optimal monetary and fiscal policies
Mark-up shocks
Commitment
Discretion
Monetary union
Policy rules
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4007
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532986
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Allan Drazen,Nuno Limão. DP4007 Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution Policies. 2003.
|
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