| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4020 |
| DP4020 Mark-Up Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy Stabilization in a Monetary Union | |
| Roel Beetsma; Henrik Jensen | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper shows that the inability of regulators to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when there is some competition between regulated firms and when firms? private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamic of regulation without such competition. The Paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long-term contracts. We found that the inability of a regulator to commit to not renegotiating long-term contracts is without consequences even if there is a bound on transfers that a firm can be asked to pay. In contrast, short-term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers. Second, absent current competition, the possibility of future entry allows the regulator to implement the first-best with a renegotiation-proof long-term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short-term contracting. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Yardstick regulation Ratchet effect Short- and long-term contracts Commitment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4020 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532998 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roel Beetsma,Henrik Jensen. DP4020 Mark-Up Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy Stabilization in a Monetary Union. 2003. |
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