全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4032 Trade Liberalization and Developing Countries Under the Doha Round

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4032
	DP4032 Trade Liberalization and Developing Countries Under the Doha Round
	Joseph Francois; Frank van Tongeren; Hans van Meijl
发表日期	2003-08-23
出版年	2003
语种	英语
摘要	This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ?managerial power? approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm?s length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers? performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, executive loans, retirement benefits, payments to departing executives, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	M14 Corporate governance Managers Shareholders Boards Directors Executive compensation Stock options Principal-agent problem Agency costs
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4032
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533008
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Joseph Francois,Frank van Tongeren,Hans van Meijl. DP4032 Trade Liberalization and Developing Countries Under the Doha Round. 2003.