G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4037
DP4037 Properties of Optimal Forecasts
Henry Allan Timmermann; Andrew Patton
发表日期2003-08-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要This Paper studies the identification problem in infinite horizon Markovian games and proposes a generally applicable estimation method. Every period firms simultaneously select an action from a finite set. We characterize the set of Markov equilibria. Period profits are a linear function of equilibrium choice probabilities. The question of identification of these values is then reduced to the existence of a solution to this linear equation system. We characterize the identification conditions. We propose a simple estimation procedure that follows the steps in the identification argument. The estimator is consistent, asymptotic normally distributed, and efficient. We have collected quarterly time series data on pubs, restaurants, coffeehouses, bakeries and carpenters for two Austrian towns between 1982 and 2002. A dynamic entry game is estimated in which firms simultaneously decide whether to enter, remain active, or exit the industry. The period profit estimates are used to simulate the equilibrium behaviour under a policy experiment in which a unit tax is imposed on firms deciding to enter the industry.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Estimation of dynamic oligopoly Entry games
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4037
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533012
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Henry Allan Timmermann,Andrew Patton. DP4037 Properties of Optimal Forecasts. 2003.
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