| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4054 |
| DP4054 An Economic Model of Child Custody | |
| Abhinay Muthoo; Marco Francesconi | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertain whether the domestic power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the home government will commit more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power?s control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East illustrate the models. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Civil conflict Foreign aid Paramilitaries Terrorist atrocities Human rights Signalling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4054 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533030 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Abhinay Muthoo,Marco Francesconi. DP4054 An Economic Model of Child Custody. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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