| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4057 |
| DP4057 Corruption and Openness | |
| Avi Simhon; Daniele Paserman; Zvika Neeman | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government will then find it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its bargaining position. In a model of redistribution to lobbies, the government will find it optimal to cap the size of lump-sum transfers it makes below the unconstrained equilibrium level. One implication is that with the optimal cap on efficient subsidies in place, less efficient subsidies will be used for redistribution even when they serve no economic function. We thus offer an alternative theory that explains why governments may optimally choose to restrict efficient lump-sum transfers to interest groups and partially replace them with relatively less efficient transfers. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Inefficient transfers Lobbies Special interests Bargaining Caps |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4057 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533033 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Avi Simhon,Daniele Paserman,Zvika Neeman. DP4057 Corruption and Openness. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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