| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4059 |
| DP4059 Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule | |
| Thierry Verdier; Daron Acemoğlu; James Robinson | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper examines the optimal structure of management when a decision-maker must have a mass of information processed before making a decision. They can either delegate processing tasks inside their own organization, in which case they retain full authority over the agents, or they hand over this authority to an outside supplier by outsourcing these activities. By incorporating authority in a stylized model of information processing, we endogenize the comparative advantage of each form of delegation, and provide novel microfoundations for the make-or-buy decision. We outline precise conditions under which giving up authority is optimal. We also show which tasks should be outsourced to align the preferences of the outside supplier with those of the decision-makers, and thereby maximize the benefits accruing from outsourcing. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information processing Boundaries of the firm Authority Delegation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4059 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,Daron Acemoğlu,James Robinson. DP4059 Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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