| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4072 |
| DP4072 Optimal Information Management: Organizations versus Markets | |
| Micael Castanheira; Mikko Leppämäki | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What is the optimal strategy of a durable-goods monopolist that can offer goods in different qualities? This Paper provides an answer for the case where the market is segmented into low- and high-income buyers. If the monopolist can change their product and price policy sufficiently rapidly - which reduces their commitment power - we find that the whole market is served immediately. Low-quality goods may be sold below costs. These results are strikingly different to those obtained with non-durable goods and to those obtained if the durable good comes only in a single quality. In an extension we further employ our results to discuss how policies of restricted versioning fare differently with non-durable and durable goods. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Price discrimination Screening Durable-goods monopolist Coase conjuncture |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4072 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533047 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Micael Castanheira,Mikko Leppämäki. DP4072 Optimal Information Management: Organizations versus Markets. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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