G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4095
DP4095 On Footloose Industries, Asymmetric Information and Wage Bargaining
Ravi Kanbur; Nancy H Chau
发表日期2003-10-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要The literature on new goods and social welfare generally assumes that manufacturers develop innovations. But innovation by users has been found to also be an important part of innovative activity in the economy. In this Paper we explore the impact of users as a source of innovation on product diversity, innovation, and welfare. We examine the impact of user innovation on inefficiencies that bias the provision of new goods, and find that most are either alleviated or non-existent for user innovation. There are three major reasons for this. First, user innovations tend to complement manufacturer innovations, filling small niches of high need left open by commercial sellers. Second, user innovation helps to reduce information asymmetries between manufacturers and users. Third, user innovations are more likely to be freely revealed than manufacturer innovations. We conclude that, compared to a counterfactual world without such innovation, social welfare is most likely to be increased by the presence of user innovation. We derive implications for policy-makers and managers.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词User innovation Product diversity Social welfare Inefficiencies
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4095
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533071
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ravi Kanbur,Nancy H Chau. DP4095 On Footloose Industries, Asymmetric Information and Wage Bargaining. 2003.
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