| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4103 |
| DP4103 Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities | |
| Xavier Vives; Timothy Van Zandt | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy-maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a ?good jobs? sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions. With strong unions and high planner preference for income equality the optimal policy is a combination of investment subsidies and progressive income taxation. If unions are weaker, the policy-maker may instead choose to tax investment. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Rent sharing Segmented labour markets Optimal taxation Redistribution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4103 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533078 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Vives,Timothy Van Zandt. DP4103 Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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