| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4114 |
| DP4114 Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Exchange Rates | |
| Jagjit S Chadha; LUCIO SARNO; Giorgio Valente | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The re-election mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favour of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency. The incentive contract does not require information about the performance of the politician and is self-financing across terms. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Incentive contracts Multi-task problems |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4114 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533089 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jagjit S Chadha,LUCIO SARNO,Giorgio Valente. DP4114 Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Exchange Rates. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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