全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4120 Nonparametric Estimation of a Dependent Competing Risks Model for Unemployment Durations

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4120
	DP4120 Nonparametric Estimation of a Dependent Competing Risks Model for Unemployment Durations
	Jan C. van Ours; Gerard Van den Berg; A Gijsbert C van Lomwel
发表日期	2003-11-23
出版年	2003
语种	英语
摘要	The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them most, shifting the ex ante probability of winning away from decisions they value less and towards decisions they value more, typically generating welfare gains over standard majority voting with non-storable votes. The equilibrium strategies have a very intuitive feature ? the number of votes cast must be monotonic in the voter?s intensity of preferences ? but are otherwise difficult to calculate, raising questions of practical implementation. In our experiments, realized efficiency levels were remarkably close to theoretical equilibrium predictions, while subjects adopted monotonic but off-equilibrium strategies. We are lead to conclude that concerns about the complexity of the game may have limited practical relevance.
主题	Public Economics
关键词	Voting systems Experiments Storable votes Committees
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4120
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533095
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jan C. van Ours,Gerard Van den Berg,A Gijsbert C van Lomwel. DP4120 Nonparametric Estimation of a Dependent Competing Risks Model for Unemployment Durations. 2003.