G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4132
DP4132 Credit Risk and Dynamic Capital Structure Choice
Josef Zechner; Thomas Dangl
发表日期2003-12-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要We analyse a model in which bank deposits are insured and there is an exogenous cost of bank capital. The former effect results in bank over-investment and the latter in under-investment. Regulatory capital requirements introduce investment distortions, which are a constrained optimal response to these market imperfections. We show that capital requirements which are constrained optimal for national banks result in under-investment by multinational banks. The extent of under-investment depends upon the home bank?s riskiness, the extent of international diversification, and the liability structure (branch or subsidiary) of the multinational. Capital requirements for international banks should therefore reflect these effects. We relate our findings to observed features of multinational banks and we discuss the possible existence of a multinational bank channel for financial contagion.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Capital adequacy requirements Deposit insurance Multinational bank
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4132
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533107
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Josef Zechner,Thomas Dangl. DP4132 Credit Risk and Dynamic Capital Structure Choice. 2003.
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