G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4147
DP4147 Job Tenure, Wages and Technology: A Reassessment Using Matched Worker-Firm Panel Data
Eric Maurin; Pauline Givord
发表日期2003-12-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要This Paper develops a model of political consensus in order to explain the missing link between inequality and political redistribution. Political consensus is an implicit agreement not to vote for extreme policy proposals. We show that such an agreement may play an efficiency-enhancing role. Voters anticipate that voting for extremist parties increases policy uncertainty in the future. A political consensus among voters reduces policy uncertainty because self-interested politicians propose non-discriminatory policies. We study how much inequality can be sustained in a democracy and how the limits to redistribution vary with initial inequality. We find that the bounds of the set of political equilibria may react in a fundamentally different manner to changes in exogenous variables than do the policy variables in the one-dimensional, one-shot game. More initial inequality need not lead to more redistribution from the rich to the poor. The maximum amount of redistribution decreases with inequality if (and only if) agents are sufficiently patient. In this case inequality is politically self-sustaining.
主题Public Economics
关键词Inequality Representative democracy Political concensus Policy uncertainty Comparative statics in political economy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4147
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533118
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Eric Maurin,Pauline Givord. DP4147 Job Tenure, Wages and Technology: A Reassessment Using Matched Worker-Firm Panel Data. 2003.
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