| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4151 |
| DP4151 Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting | |
| Hans Gersbach; Volker Hahn | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the role of underwriter compensation in mitigating conflicts of interest between companies going public and their investment bankers. Making the bank?s compensation more sensitive to the issuer?s valuation should reduce agency conflicts and thus underpricing (Baron (1982); Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002)). Consistent with this prediction, we show that contracting on higher commissions in a large sample of UK IPOs completed between 1991-2002 leads to significantly lower initial returns, after controlling for other influences on underpricing and a variety of endogeneity concerns. These results indicate that issuing firms? contractual choices affect the pricing behaviour of their IPO underwriters. Moreover, we cannot reliably reject the hypothesis that the intensity of incentives is optimal, and so that contracts are efficient. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Initial public offerings Underpricing Intermediation Integrated securities houses Underwriting contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4151 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533122 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Volker Hahn. DP4151 Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting. 2003. |
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