| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4152 |
| DP4152 Globalization and the Evolution of the Supply Chain: Who Gains and Who Loses? | |
| Jacques-François Thisse; Masahisa Fujita | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities, we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least Bayes-Nash equilibrium - each one in strategies monotone in type - if the payoff to a player displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types, and if the posteriors are increasing in type with respect to first-order stochastic dominance (e.g. if types are affiliated). The result holds for multidimensional action and type spaces and also for continuous and discrete type distributions. It uses an intermediate result on monotone comparative statics under uncertainty, which implies that the extremal equilibria increase when there is a first-order stochastic dominant shift in beliefs. We provide an application to strategic information revelation in games of voluntary disclosure. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Supermodular games Incomplete information First-order stochastic dominance Cournot tatônnement Monotone comparative statics Voluntary disclosure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4152 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533123 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jacques-François Thisse,Masahisa Fujita. DP4152 Globalization and the Evolution of the Supply Chain: Who Gains and Who Loses?. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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