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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4161 |
DP4161 How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts? | |
Steven Kaplan; Per Strömberg; Frederic Martel | |
发表日期 | 2003-12-23 |
出版年 | 2003 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Empirical research on the gravity model of international trade in the wake of Rose (2000) affirms that currency union formation doubles or triples trade. Currency unions could, however, also be established precisely because trade among their members was already high. In OLS estimation, this would cause endogeneity bias. The present Paper employs both fixed-effects and binary choice methods to trace endogeneity in the formation of historical currency arrangements. Studying the formation of currency blocs in the 1930s, we find strong evidence of endogeneity. We work with country-group fixed effects and find that already in the 1920s, trade within the later currency blocs was up to three times higher than average. The formal establishment of these blocs had only insignificant or even negative effects on the coefficients. We also employ a probit approach to predict membership in these later arrangements on the basis of data from the 1920s. Results are remarkably robust and again indicate strong self-selection bias. Evaluated against the control groups, treatment effects in the 1930s were mostly absent. Even the post-war currency arrangements are visible in the inter-war data. In line with the theory of optimum currency areas, our results caution against optimism over trade creation by currency unions. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Currency blocs Gravity model Endogeneity Treatment effects |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4161 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533132 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven Kaplan,Per Strömberg,Frederic Martel. DP4161 How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts?. 2003. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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