| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4162 |
| DP4162 Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; William J Wilhelm Jr; Felicia Marston | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this Paper we show that legal aid can be part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error, both guilty and innocent individuals are better off because the marginal cost of defense expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Sanction Self-reporting Legal aid |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4162 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533133 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,William J Wilhelm Jr,Felicia Marston. DP4162 Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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