G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4167
DP4167 Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does PSI Help?
Olivier Cadot; Marcelo Olarreaga; José Anson
发表日期2003-12-23
出版年2003
语种英语
摘要In this Paper, we suggest a new motivation for why central banks appear averse to reversing recent changes in their interest rate. We show, in a standard monetary model with forward-looking expectations, data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty, that there is a learning cost associated with interest rate reversals. A policy that frequently reverses the interest rate makes it more difficult for the central bank and private agents to learn the key parameters of the model. Optimal monetary policy internalizes this learning cost and therefore has a lower number of interest rate reversals. The incentive to reduce the number of interest rate reversals is in addition to the optimal policy inertia created by the presence of forward-looking expectations and uncertainty in the model.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Interest rate smoothing Learning monetary policy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4167
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533136
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Olivier Cadot,Marcelo Olarreaga,José Anson. DP4167 Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does PSI Help?. 2003.
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