| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4167 |
| DP4167 Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does PSI Help? | |
| Olivier Cadot; Marcelo Olarreaga; José Anson | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper, we suggest a new motivation for why central banks appear averse to reversing recent changes in their interest rate. We show, in a standard monetary model with forward-looking expectations, data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty, that there is a learning cost associated with interest rate reversals. A policy that frequently reverses the interest rate makes it more difficult for the central bank and private agents to learn the key parameters of the model. Optimal monetary policy internalizes this learning cost and therefore has a lower number of interest rate reversals. The incentive to reduce the number of interest rate reversals is in addition to the optimal policy inertia created by the presence of forward-looking expectations and uncertainty in the model. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Interest rate smoothing Learning monetary policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4167 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533136 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Olivier Cadot,Marcelo Olarreaga,José Anson. DP4167 Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does PSI Help?. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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