| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4173 |
| DP4173 Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability | |
| Thomas Cooley; Ramon Marimon; Vincenzo Quadrini | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms? ability to sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers facilitate collusion through the operation of an outlets effect: cheating unintegrated firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals. Vertical integration also facilitates collusion through a reaction effect: the vertically-integrated firm?s contract with its downstream affiliate can be more flexible and thus allows a swifter reaction in punishing defectors. Offsetting these two effects is a possible punishment effect that arises if the integrated structure is able to make more profits in the punishment phase than a disintegrated structure. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Vertical mergers Collusion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4173 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533144 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Cooley,Ramon Marimon,Vincenzo Quadrini. DP4173 Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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