| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4184 |
| DP4184 Labour and the Market Value of the Firm | |
| Eran Yashiv; Monika Merz | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper examines the role of employment protection when firms learn over time about the value of the match. When parties can commit to future wages, equilibrium contracts stipulate positive severance payments as an instrument to induce efficient lay-off decisions and there is no room for public intervention. When parties cannot commit to future wages, ex-post bargaining leads to excessive dismissals, and therefore the market provides insufficient employment protection. In this case, a Pigouvian tax/subsidy scheme will correct the inefficiency by enhancing employment protection. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Severance payments Lay-offs Experimentation Employment protection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4184 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533154 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eran Yashiv,Monika Merz. DP4184 Labour and the Market Value of the Firm. 2004. |
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