G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4188
DP4188 Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase
Mark Gradstein
发表日期2004-01-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要This Paper studies the design of education policies in a setting of successive generations with heterogeneous individuals (high and low earning ability). Parents? investment in education is motivated by warm-glow altruism and determines the probability that a child has high ability. Education policies consist of a subsidy on private educational investments and possibly of public education. We show that when an income tax is available, the subsidy on education should not depend on redistributive considerations. Instead, it is determined by two terms. First, a Pigouvian term that arises because under warm-glow altruism parents? utility does not properly account for the impact of education on future generations. The second term captures a ?merit good? effect, which arises when the warm-glow term is not fully included in social welfare (possibility of laundering out). The two terms are of opposite sign and the optimal subsidy may be positive or negative. Finally, we derive conditions under which public education is welfare-improving and show that total crowding out of private expenditure (for one of the types) may be desirable.
主题Public Economics
关键词Education policy Intergenerational transfers Human capital Redistribution
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4188
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533157
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mark Gradstein. DP4188 Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase. 2004.
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