全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4193 Labour Market Frictions, Job Insecurity and the Flexibility of the Employment Relationship

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4193
	DP4193 Labour Market Frictions, Job Insecurity and the Flexibility of the Employment Relationship
	Niko Matouschek; Paolo Ramezzana; Frédéric Robert-Nicoud
发表日期	2004-01-23
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	This Paper examines how the investment of financially constrained firms varies with their level of internal funds. We develop a theoretical model of optimal investment under financial constraints. Our model endogenizes the costs of external funds and allows for negative levels of internal funds. We show that the resulting relationship between internal funds and investment is U-shaped. In particular, when a firm?s internal funds are negative and sufficiently low, a further decrease leads to an increase in investment. This effect is driven by the investor?s participation constraint: when part of any loan must be used to close a financing gap, the investor will provide funds only if the firm invests at a scale large enough to generate the revenue that enables the firm to repay. We test our theory using a dataset with close to 100,000 firm-year observations. The data strongly support our predictions. Among other results, we find a negative relationship between measures of internal funds and investment for a substantial share of financially constrained firms. Our results also help to explain some contrasting findings in the empirical investment literature.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	Financial constraints Capital market imperfections Financial contracts investment Internal funds Investment-cash flow sensitivity
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4193
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533162
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Niko Matouschek,Paolo Ramezzana,Frédéric Robert-Nicoud. DP4193 Labour Market Frictions, Job Insecurity and the Flexibility of the Employment Relationship. 2004.