全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP4196 Will China's WTO Accession Worsen Rural Poverty?

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP4196
	DP4196 Will China's WTO Accession Worsen Rural Poverty?
	Kym Anderson; Elena Ianchovichina; Jikun Huang
发表日期	2004-01-23
出版年	2004
语种	英语
摘要	This Paper analyses dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed their income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. Contrary to intuition, we demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogo (1989). From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.
主题	Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics
关键词	Long-term contracts Risk sharing Limited commitment Competition
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp4196
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533164
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Kym Anderson,Elena Ianchovichina,Jikun Huang. DP4196 Will China's WTO Accession Worsen Rural Poverty?. 2004.