Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4196 |
DP4196 Will China's WTO Accession Worsen Rural Poverty? | |
Kym Anderson; Elena Ianchovichina; Jikun Huang | |
发表日期 | 2004-01-23 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This Paper analyses dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed their income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. Contrary to intuition, we demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogo (1989). From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Long-term contracts Risk sharing Limited commitment Competition |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4196 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533164 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kym Anderson,Elena Ianchovichina,Jikun Huang. DP4196 Will China's WTO Accession Worsen Rural Poverty?. 2004. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。