| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4214 |
| DP4214 Working for God? | |
| Jakob Svensson; Ritva Reinikka | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. Even if an agent is law abiding, they may still commit the act accidentally. The agents are wealth constrained. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. If the benefit from the crime is small, the optimal sanction scheme is decreasing in the number of offenses. In contrast, if the benefit is large, sanctions are increasing in the number of offenses. Increasing sanctions do not make the criminal track less attractive; they make honesty more attractive. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Crime and punishment Repeat offenders |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4214 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533182 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jakob Svensson,Ritva Reinikka. DP4214 Working for God?. 2004. |
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