| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4231 |
| DP4231 Overconfidence and Delegated Portfolio Management | |
| Frédéric Palomino; Abdolkarim Sadrieh | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Following extensive empirical evidence about ?market anomalies? and overconfidence, the analysis of financial markets with agents overconfident about the precision of their private information has received a lot of attention. All these models consider agents trading for their own account. In this article, we analyse a standard delegated portfolio management problem between a financial institution and a money manager who may be of two types: rational or overconfident. We consider several situations. In each case, we derive the optimal contract and results on the performance of financial institution hiring overconfident managers relative to institutions hiring rational agents, and results on the price impact of overconfidence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Overconfidence Optimal contract Risk-taking incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4231 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533198 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Frédéric Palomino,Abdolkarim Sadrieh. DP4231 Overconfidence and Delegated Portfolio Management. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
