| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4236 |
| DP4236 Retail Mergers: Buyer Power and Product Variety | |
| Roman Inderst; Greg Shaffer | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a differential game in which the joint choices of the two players influences the variance, but not the mean, of the one-dimensional state variable. We interpret this state variable as a summary of how far ?ahead? player 1 is in the game. At each moment in time, players receive a flow pay-off which is a continuous, monotonic and bounded function of the state variable. We show that a Markov Perfect Equilibrium exists and has the property that patient players chose to play it safe when sufficiently ahead and to take risks when sufficiently behind. We also provide a simple condition that implies both players choose risky strategies when neither one is too far ahead, a situation that ensures a dominant player emerges ?quickly?. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | R&d competition Differential games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4236 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Greg Shaffer. DP4236 Retail Mergers: Buyer Power and Product Variety. 2004. |
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