| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4240 |
| DP4240 Spatial Wage Disparities: Sorting Matters! | |
| Gilles Gilles Duranton; Pierre-Philippe Combes; Laurent Gobillon | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This Paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non-elected bureaucrats. Politicians are preferable for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers. We then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and we show that the two generally differ. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | K00 Politics Delegation Bureaucracies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4240 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533206 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gilles Gilles Duranton,Pierre-Philippe Combes,Laurent Gobillon. DP4240 Spatial Wage Disparities: Sorting Matters!. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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