| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4241 |
| DP4241 On-the-Job Training, Firing Costs and Employment | |
| Dennis Snower; Pilar Diaz-Vazquez | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper starts from the result of Rochet (1989), that with distortionary income taxes social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. The main purpose of the present Paper is to study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Social insurance Redistribution Market failures |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4241 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533207 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dennis Snower,Pilar Diaz-Vazquez. DP4241 On-the-Job Training, Firing Costs and Employment. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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