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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP4243 |
DP4243 Unemployment in the EU: Institutions, Prices and Growth | |
Dennis Snower; Marika Karanassou; Hector Sala | |
发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
出版年 | 2004 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This Paper shows that over monitoring a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine loyalty and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. This intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we lose the opportunity to learn how the partner will behave when not monitored. Only by allowing the partner the possibility to misbehave is there a chance to determine their characteristics at a time when separation would be possible at a relatively low cost. |
主题 | Labour Economics |
关键词 | M50 Monitoring Probation Effort Asymmetric information |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4243 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533209 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dennis Snower,Marika Karanassou,Hector Sala. DP4243 Unemployment in the EU: Institutions, Prices and Growth. 2004. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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