| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4249 |
| DP4249 Go For Broke or Play it Safe? Dynamic Competition with Choice of Variance | |
| Luis Cabral; Axel Anderson | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations pre-determined by the public, since less competent candidates are elected or wage costs and tax distortions are higher. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Incentive contracts Politicians Compensation Elections and wages Free riding Underprovision |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4249 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533215 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luis Cabral,Axel Anderson. DP4249 Go For Broke or Play it Safe? Dynamic Competition with Choice of Variance. 2004. |
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