| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4251 |
| DP4251 International Monetary Policy Coordination and Financial Market Integration | |
| Alan Sutherland | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The fact that according to the celebrated Coase theorem rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. We show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always trying to exploit all gains from trade, may in fact be solved by taxation. Thus, in our framework Coasean bargaining is not a substitute for Pigouvian taxation; instead it is the very reason for government intervention. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hold-up problems Bargaining Contracts Taxation Externalities |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4251 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533217 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan Sutherland. DP4251 International Monetary Policy Coordination and Financial Market Integration. 2004. |
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