| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4252 |
| DP4252 Bureaucrats or Politicians? | |
| Guido Tabellini; Alberto Alesina | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller?s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility loss when they have to pay more than the reserve price, the impact on the optimal reserve price can be strong when there are many bidders. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Behavioural economics Auction theory Reserve prices Reference points |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4252 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533218 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Tabellini,Alberto Alesina. DP4252 Bureaucrats or Politicians?. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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