G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP4252
DP4252 Bureaucrats or Politicians?
Guido Tabellini; Alberto Alesina
发表日期2004-02-23
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserve price (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to the usual result, the seller?s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility loss when they have to pay more than the reserve price, the impact on the optimal reserve price can be strong when there are many bidders.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Behavioural economics Auction theory Reserve prices Reference points
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp4252
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533218
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Guido Tabellini,Alberto Alesina. DP4252 Bureaucrats or Politicians?. 2004.
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