| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4253 |
| DP4253 Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection | |
| Pierre Pestieau; Maurice G. Marchand; Robin Boadway; Manuel Leite-Monteiro | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we study the impact of credit risk transfer (CRT) on the stability and the efficiency of a financial system in a model with endogenous intermediation and production. Our analysis suggests that with respect to CRT, the individual incentives of the agents in the economy are generally aligned with social incentives. Hence, CRT does not pose a systematic challenge to the functioning of the financial system and is generally welfare enhancing. We identify issues that should be addressed by the regulatory authorities in order to minimize the potential costs of CRT. These include: ensuring regulatory standards that reflect differences in the social cost of instability in the banking and insurance sector; and promoting CRT instruments that are not detrimental to the monitoring incentives of banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Credit risk transfer Efficiency Stability Intermediation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4253 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533219 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Pestieau,Maurice G. Marchand,Robin Boadway,et al. DP4253 Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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