| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4258 |
| DP4258 Occupational Choice Across Generations | |
| Klaus F. Zimmermann; Amelie Constant | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses the impact of term limits in a political agency model. We find that term limits reduce the value of holding office. This reduction in the re-election incentive can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their own private preferences. Such ?truthful? behaviour by incumbents will in turn result in better screening of incumbents whose preferences do not correspond to voters? preferences. We show that these effects can make a two-term limit, which is the empirically most frequent restriction on tenure, ex ante welfare-improving from the perspective of voters. We present evidence from gubernatorial elections that the model?s main empirical implication is supported by the data. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political agency Accountability Term limits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4258 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533224 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus F. Zimmermann,Amelie Constant. DP4258 Occupational Choice Across Generations. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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