| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4260 |
| DP4260 Bank Mergers, Competition and Liquidity | |
| Philipp Hartmann; Giancarlo Spagnolo; Elena Carletti | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We extend the model of Schultz (1996) to a dynamic setting with no policy commitment. Two parties that compete for election must choose the level of provision of a public good as well as the tax payment needed to finance it. The cost of producing the good may be high or low and this information is not known to the voters. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which the party that does not want much of the public good use the inefficient (high cost) technology even though the efficient one is available. Using the low cost technology would, by informing the voters about the cost parameter, force it to produce an excessively high level of the good. Interestingly, this equilibrium is not symmetric, suggesting that a party with a strong taste for the public good is less likely to adopt a wasteful policy. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Commitment Dynamic electoral competition Ratchet effect |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4260 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533226 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philipp Hartmann,Giancarlo Spagnolo,Elena Carletti. DP4260 Bank Mergers, Competition and Liquidity. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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