| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4264 |
| DP4264 Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points | |
| Stephanie Rosenkranz; Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses firms? capital allocation decisions when optimal capital structure is linked to the risk of underlying assets and when equity capital is costly and cannot be raised instantaneously. In the model, division managers receive private information and authority is delegated to them over risky project choices. The optimal mechanisms are related to EVA compensation and RAROC performance measurement systems. In the optimal mechanism, position limits will be employed but are not always completely utilized. Hurdle rates reflect capital allocation through a division-specific capital structure. In the multidivisional context the optimal capital allocation mechanism incorporates valuable externalities leading to overall firm EVA maximization. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial institutions Banking Capital budgeting Investment policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4264 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533230 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephanie Rosenkranz,Patrick W. Schmitz. DP4264 Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
