| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4272 |
| DP4272 Term Limits and Electoral Accountability | |
| Daniel Sturm; Michael Smart | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper models a sequential merger formation game with endogenous efficiency gains in which every merger has to be submitted for approval to the Antitrust Authority (AA). Two different types of AA are studied: first, a myopic AA, which judges a given merger without considering that subsequent mergers may occur; and, second, a forward-looking AA, which anticipates the ultimate market structure a given merger will lead to. By contrasting the decisions of these two types of AA, merger policy implications can be drawn. In particular, the efficiency offence argument does not find any justification under a forward-looking AA. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Endogenous mergers Foresight Efficiency offence |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4272 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533236 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Sturm,Michael Smart. DP4272 Term Limits and Electoral Accountability. 2004. |
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