| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4275 |
| DP4275 Ex Post Inefficiency in a Political Agency Model | |
| Georges Casamatta; Caroline De Paoli | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper provides a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information. First, we show that if each player's incremental ex post pay-off is uniformly increasing in its own action and type, and its type is sufficiently uninformative of the types of its opponents (independence), then its expected pay-off satisfies a strict single crossing property in its own action and type, for any strategy profile played by its opponents. This ensures that a player's best response to any strategy profile is a monotone pure strategy. Secondly, we show that if, in addition, there is sufficient heterogeneity of the conditional density of types, then the best response correspondence is a contraction mapping. This ensures equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Our approach allows us to establish these results in a wide range of applications, including cases where there are no existing existence results. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Incomplete information Heterogeneity Existence Unique pure strategy equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4275 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533238 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georges Casamatta,Caroline De Paoli. DP4275 Ex Post Inefficiency in a Political Agency Model. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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