| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4280 |
| DP4280 Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline' | |
| Daniel Cohen; Richard Portes | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide ?stepping stones? into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons, workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey, we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60%. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of endogenous selection into temporary employment. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | M50 Temporary work Contract-based incentives Absenteeism Overtime Moral hazard Career concerns |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4280 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533239 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Cohen,Richard Portes. DP4280 Dealing with Destabilizing 'Market Discipline'. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Daniel Cohen]的文章 |
| [Richard Portes]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Daniel Cohen]的文章 |
| [Richard Portes]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Daniel Cohen]的文章 |
| [Richard Portes]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
