| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP4286 |
| DP4286 Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms | |
| Jan Pieter Krahnen; Ralf Elsas | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses whether different emission trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission-trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Agreements climate Incentives Negotiations Policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp4286 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/533248 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jan Pieter Krahnen,Ralf Elsas. DP4286 Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms. 2004. |
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